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THE MELENDEZ-DIAZ DILEMMA: VIRGINIA’S RESPONSE,
A MODEL TO FOLLOW
Anne Hampton Andrews*
INTRODUCTION
Striking a balance between protecting society from criminals and preserving the
rights of defendants has always been a difficult and challenging responsibility.  In
June 2009 the United States Supreme Court tipped the balance in favor of criminal
defendants by broadening their Sixth Amendment rights.1  While defense attorneys
believed the decision would provide them with a tactical advantage, prosecutors
were concerned that chaos would erupt in the judicial system and many potentially
guilty defendants would avoid conviction.
In Virginia, the legislature recognized an immediate need to address the poten-
tial ramifications of this decision.  For more than a decade, the Virginia General
Assembly has been deeply divided on fiscal and policy issues.  Consequently, it is a
difficult and lengthy process to reach a resolution when controversial legislation is
proposed.  Despite a tumultuous history and bitter divide between the House of
Delegates and the Virginia Senate, democrats and republicans, legislators from both
bodies and parties set partisan politics aside to fashion a remedy.  Remarkably, the
Virginia legislators accomplished this task in a one day session.2
A fundamental tenet of the American judicial system is the right to a fair and
impartial trial, governed by the judicial constraints set forth in the United States
Constitution.3  Among those constraints is a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to confront his accuser at trial.4  The wording of this constitutional guarantee
has prompted federal and state courts to consider the breadth and limitations of the
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2011; B.A., College of William & Mary, 2006.
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1 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
2 See 2010-3 Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. 587 (LexisNexis). The Virginia General Assembly
approved Senate Bill 106 during its 2010 session, which amended sections 18.2-472.1, 19.2-
187, and 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Virginia. See id. These amendments, however, are not
relevant to this Note.
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 Id. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
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Confrontation Clause, specifically, whether the defendant’s right to confront witnesses
against him is unlimited or whether there are restrictions on this constitutional right.5
The United States Supreme Court, in an unprecedented interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, expanded the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
in the case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.6  In its decision, the Court abandoned
the former interpretation of the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
in order to obtain a particular result; whereas, the dissent adhered to the principles
of stare decisis.7  In Melendez-Diaz, the Court vastly enhanced the scope of the Sixth
Amendment by interpreting the Confrontation Clause to allow criminal defendants a
greater right of cross-examination.8
This Note uses Virginia as a case study to show the profound impact that
Melendez-Diaz had on the prosecutorial system, and how statutory construction may
simplify these effects.  By discussing the benefits of notice-and-demand statutes9 in
light of Melendez-Diaz, this Note offers Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute as the
model, which will ensure criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment protections and will
also provide both administrative and economic relief for the judicial system.
Part I of this Note will review the history of the Sixth Amendment’s Confron-
tation Clause, including a general history of the purpose of this constitutional guar-
antee.  Additionally, it will discuss both United States Supreme Court and state court
cases that have interpreted the parameters of the Sixth Amendment.  Part II will assess
the 1979 version of Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute, and its bearing on the Sixth
Amendment as a result of Melendez-Diaz.  Also, this Part will examine and explain
the responses of Virginia legislators, attorneys, and citizens to Melendez-Diaz.  Further-
more, this Part will include an analysis of notice-and-demand statutes enacted in
5 See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (determining that the Sixth Amendment
does not bar admission of an unavailable witness’s statements against the defendant at a criminal
trial if his prior testimony bore adequate “indicia of reliability”). The reliability test can be met
where “evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or where there is a “showing
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id.; see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532
(determining that the core class of “testimonial” statements from Crawford, which included
affidavits but not certificates of analysis as a subcategory of affidavits, now interprets certifi-
cates of analysis as affidavits, a category of testimonial evidence that subjects the drafters of
these certificates to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause); Crawford v. United States,
541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004) (determining that the Sixth Amendment provides the defendant
with the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses from whom the police have gathered
written statements).
6 129 S. Ct. 2527.
7 Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 2532 (majority opinion).
9 Under a notice-and-demand statute, the government must give “notice” of its intent to
use written materials at trial in lieu of live testimony. This type of statute further provides the
defendant the opportunity to “demand” live testimony in lieu of the prepared written materials.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009).
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various states, as well as Virginia’s legislative response to Melendez-Diaz.  Part III
will discuss and analyze the detrimental impact that Melendez-Diaz has had on the
criminal justice system, with a particular focus on its implications in Virginia.  This
Part will discuss the required presence of the authors of certificates of analysis at both
criminal hearings and trials, focusing on cases where the defendant has been charged
with possession of narcotics and cases where the defendant has been charged with
driving under the influence.  Additionally, this Part will explain Virginia’s reasons
for recent amendments to its notice-and-demand statute10 in response to Melendez-
Diaz.  Finally, Part IV posits that Virginia’s recently amended notice-and-demand
statute complies with the Sixth Amendment’s fundamental protection for a criminal
defendant to confront witnesses against him.  This Note hypothesizes that if the consti-
tutionality of Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute is challenged under the standard
adopted in Melendez-Diaz, it should withstand such a constitutional challenge.
I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: A HISTORY OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO
CONFRONT HIS ACCUSER
A. Purpose of the Confrontation Clause
A paramount guarantee and protection under the United States Constitution is the
right of a criminal defendant to a fair and impartial trial.11  The Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause is one of several mechanisms to ensure this constitutional guar-
antee.12  “[T]he Sixth Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”13  Should a state legislature pass a law that a defendant subse-
quently alleges infringes upon this constitutional right, as the defendants alleged in
Ohio v. Roberts14 and in Coy v. Iowa,15 the constitutionality of the law will likely be
challenged in the judicial arena.16
10 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009).
11 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
12 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution also guarantees a criminal defen-
dant the right to a speedy trial and the right to a public trial before an unbiased jury. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. This Amendment also guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have compulsory
process to call witnesses in his support. Id. In addition, this Amendment guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to counsel. Id. The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the
Confrontation Clause in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
13 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403–04 (1965) (“[T]he right of cross-examination is
included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him.”);
accord Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004);
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62–63 (1980).
14 448 U.S. 56, abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
15 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
16 For example, section 2945.49 of the Ohio Code was challenged in Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, where the Supreme Court held that allowing certain recorded statements to be admitted
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The Constitution provides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”17  A formalist, who
interprets the language of the Constitution literally, would construe the words of the
Sixth Amendment to require “on objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a
declarant not present at trial.”18  If the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause was
applied literally, it would “abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long
rejected as unintended and too extreme.”19  Melendez-Diaz marks a shift in Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence toward a “literal” standard.  This literal interpretation places
no definitive limit on how far in advance of the hearing or the trial a defendant must
demand the presence of an expert.20  Consequently, an enormous burden will rest on
the prosecution to ensure that these witnesses appear at trial.21
into evidence without providing the defendant the opportunity to confront the individual putting
forth those statements did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. Section 910A.14
of the Iowa Code was challenged in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1998), where the Supreme
Court held that allowing witnesses who were victims of sexual abuse to have a large screen
placed between them and the defendant during their testimony and denying the defendant the
right to cross-examination did violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63; see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)
(“[T]here could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the provision in question than
the admission of dying declarations.”).
19 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. While the Court in Roberts asserted that the Confrontation
Clause should not be applied literally because it would eliminate all exceptions to the hearsay
rule, the Court in recent years has taken a more formalistic view in determining the breadth of
the Confrontation Clause. Consequently, a defendant’s right to confront his accuser has become
more expansive and the state’s ability to use affidavits and other forms of documentation in lieu
of having the witness present for trial has greatly diminished. This trend is apparent and is re-
flected in Supreme Court decisions over the past thirty years from Roberts to Melendez-Diaz.
The elasticity of the Confrontation Clause is discussed throughout this Note. One may argue that
the recent expansion of rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is largely attributable to
the more conservative composition of the Court.
20 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009).
21 See generally Cuccinelli Calls for Special Session: Drug Dealers and Drunk Drivers,
APPOMATTOX NEWS (July 10, 2009), http://www.appomattoxnews.com/2009/cuccinelli-calls
-for-special-session-drug-dealers-and-drunk-drivers.html [hereinafter Cuccinelli Calls for Spe-
cial Session] (“Until the ruling in Melendez-Diaz, the Virginia state forensic lab was able to sub-
mit a certificate of analysis of their findings for use in court in drug and D.U.I. cases. . . . ‘With
the volume of cases analyzed, requiring court appearances by the scientist in every case has the
potential to cripple the criminal justice system,’ noted Cuccinelli.”); Charlie Passut,
Prosecutors on Defense: Federal Decision may have Implication in Local Cases, TIDEWATER
NEWS (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.tidewaternews.com/2009/08/05/prosecutors-on-defense/
(“From a practical standpoint, it is going to be more difficult . . . . We have a limited number of
analysts who perform the tests, and they’re performing the tests for a large number of courts and
jurisdictions. It will make it more difficult to prosecute, particularly our drug cases, but I don’t
think it will affect the way we prosecute them other than we will be subpoenaing witnesses that
we have not had to subpoena in the past.” (quoting Wayne Farmer, Commonwealth’s Attorney
for the Isle of Wight)).
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Although a literal interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
may place an undue burden on the prosecution, the purpose of the Amendment is to
guarantee the defendant, with certain limited exceptions, the opportunity to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him.  “[T]he Confrontation Clause reflects a pref-
erence for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that ‘a primary interest secured by
[the provision] is the right of cross-examination.’”22  In essence,
the [Confrontation] Clause envisions ‘a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an op-
portunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the con-
science of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face
with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his tes-
timony whether he is worthy of belief.’23
B. Case Law Interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
As a result of judicial interpretation, the scope of the Confrontation Clause has
become more expansive over the past thirty years.  Consequently, the defendant has
additional safeguards to ensure his right to confront his accuser.  This concept of elas-
ticity is evident by the Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause in Roberts, Crawford v. United States,24 and Melendez-Diaz.  The Court in
Roberts, was equally, if not more concerned, with providing certainty and efficiency
for the judiciary than ensuring that the defendant had a right to cross-examine any
unavailable witnesses who bore evidence against him.25  Today, Roberts is no longer
good law and all state and federal court decisions must comport with Melendez-
Diaz.26  According to Melendez-Diaz, a witness being unavailable, unless the defen-
dant otherwise consents or had a prior chance for cross-examination, is no excuse to
deny a criminal defendant the right to confront his accuser.27
When Roberts was controlling, the State had the burden of showing that the wit-
ness was unavailable and unable to appear in court before a court could allow the
unavailable declarant’s statements.28  “[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that
he is unavailable.”29  Upon making a determination that the witness is unavailable,
22 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)).
23 Id. at 63–64 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43).
24 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
25 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
26 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 (2009).
27 Id. at 2531.
28 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
29 Id. at 66.
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the court’s next step in considering whether his testimony is admissible is determining
whether his statement “bears adequate indicia of reliability.”30  The statements made
by a witness outside of court could be admitted at trial if the following were shown. 
First, the absent witness was unavailable to appear at the trial.31  Second, the testimony
was reliable.32  The reliability requirement could be met by showing either the wit-
ness statement fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or there was a showing
of trustworthiness.33
The defendant in Crawford was tried before a Washington state court for assault
and attempted murder.34  The defendant objected to his wife testifying against him
because Washington’s marital privilege bars testimony by a spouse without the other
spouse’s consent.35  His objection was sustained pursuant to section 5.60.060(1) of the
Washington Code.36  The trial court had allowed the prosecution to play a tape-recorded
statement by the accused’s wife describing the accused’s stabbing of the victim.37 
Before the Washington Court of Appeals, the defendant objected and claimed that the
playing of the tape-recorded statement violated his constitutional right to confront
witnesses against him.38  The appeals court reversed the trial court.39  Subsequently,
the Washington Supreme Court unanimously reversed the appellate court and affirmed
the trial court’s decision by reinstating the conviction.40  The United States Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari and ultimately reversed the court below.41
The Court in Crawford concluded that the Confrontation Clause
applies to “witnesses” against the accused—in other words, those
who “bear testimony.” . . .  An accuser who makes a formal state-
ment to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a per-
son who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. 
30 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. (“Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent
a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”).
34 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004).
35 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410).
36 WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994) (“A spouse or domestic partner shall not be ex-
amined for or against his or her spouse or domestic partner, without the consent of the spouse or
domestic partner; nor can either during marriage or during the domestic partnership or afterward,
be without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other
during the marriage or the domestic partnership.”).
37 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 41.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 36.
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The constitutional text . . . thus reflects an especially acute con-
cern with a specific type of out-of-court statement.42
Crawford expressly applied to the admission of hearsay statements in criminal pro-
ceedings, and the Court concluded that the wife’s statements implicating her hus-
band at the crime scene were hearsay statements subject to the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause.43
Crawford overruled the position set forth in Roberts that allowed testimonial state-
ments such as, affidavits, custodial examinations, and prior testimony by witnesses that
the defendant was unable to cross-examine, so long as there was a good faith showing
that the witness was unavailable at trial and that the testimony of the witness was re-
liable.44  The Court in Crawford held that its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause has “remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding: Testimonial
statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant
is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.”45
Under Crawford, “[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium
of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation.”46  After Crawford, the question that arose was
whether the requirement that the defense has a right to confront witnesses against
him applies to forensic scientists testifying to their certificates of analysis.47  In de-
cisions following Crawford, courts have been split in determining whether certifi-
cates of analysis are a type of affidavit.  A majority of courts, including the Virginia
state courts, have concluded that forensic certificates were not within the scope of
Crawford and therefore, the certificates were not classified as a core class of testimo-
nial statements subject to the Confrontation Clause.48  The reasoning for the belief that
certificates of analysis were not included under the umbrella of affidavits as estab-
lished by Crawford was that statements of a witness at a crime scene do not fall within
the same category as these certificates.49
42 Id. at 51 (“Various formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’ statements exist: ‘ex
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custo-
dial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.’”)
(citations omitted).
43 Id. at 68–69.
44 Id. at 62–63.
45 Id. at 59.
46 Id. at 68–69.
47 Certificates of analysis are laboratory results from testing narcotics and from testing blood
samples to determine whether an individual was driving while intoxicated. For example, see the
state law at issue in Melendez-Diaz, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. III, § 13 (2010).
48 See, e.g., infra notes 67–68.
49 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2529 (2009). Perhaps one reason
why the Court in Crawford did not expressly include statements from expert analysts as a core
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C. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
Melendez-Diaz held that certificates of analysis were a type of affidavit50 and
therefore, according to Crawford, part of the core class of testimonial statements
covered by the Confrontation Clause.51  At trial, the prosecution introduced a certifi-
cate of analysis from a state laboratory as evidence that the substance seized from
Melendez-Diaz, the defendant, was cocaine.52  The defense objected, arguing that under
Crawford, analysts were required to testify in person, and that admitting evidence
without testimony from the scientific analyst who tested the substance violated the
Confrontation Clause.53  The trial court overruled the objection, admitted the certif-
icate of analysis, and subsequently, the jury found the defendant guilty of distributing
and trafficking cocaine.54  The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the holding
of the trial court,55 and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied defendant’s
request for appeal.56  Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed the Massachusetts state courts, holding that the admission of a certifi-
cate of analysis violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
against him.57
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, which examined Crawford, and
relied on the following statement from Crawford that defines “testimonial statements.”58
“Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits . . . ex-
trajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affi-
davits . . . .”59  Justice Scalia, along with a majority of the Court, interpreted certificates
of analysis to be a type of affidavit, thus placing them in the category of testimonial
evidence subject to the Confrontation Clause.60  The Court, in Melendez-Diaz, looked
to Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “affidavits,” which are “declaration[s]
of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to
class of testimonial statements is because the evidence provided by these sworn certificates is
extremely reliable.
50 Id. at 2530.
51 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
52 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.




57 Id. at 2527.
58 Id. at 2531.
59 Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)).
60 Id. at 2532 (“There is little doubt that the documents at issue in this case fall within the
‘core class of testimonial statements’ thus described. Our description of the category mentions
affidavits twice. . . . The documents at issue here, while denominated by Massachusetts law
‘certificates,’ are quite plainly affidavits . . . .” (citations omitted)).
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administer oaths.”61  As a result of this interpretation, the authors of these certificates
are subject to confrontation and cross-examination by the defendant at trial.62
II. THE HISTORY OF VIRGINIA’S NOTICE-AND-DEMAND STATUTE
A. Section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Virginia
Prior to the Melendez-Diaz decision, Virginia afforded criminal defendants a stat-
utory right to examine individuals performing expert analysis.63  Until the members
of the Virginia General Assembly voted to amend section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of
Virginia during the 2009 Special Session, which was held on August 19, 2009, this
section did not directly impose any time limitation on the defendant in which he had
to “demand” the analyst’s presence for either the hearing or the trial.64  However, in
order to admit a certificate of analysis into evidence , the burden was on the prosecu-
tion to file the certificate with the clerk of court at least seven days prior to trial.65
In 2007 there were three cases originating in different circuit courts throughout
the Commonwealth that interpreted section 19.2-187.1 and were subsequently appealed
to the Virginia Court of Appeals.  On appeal before the Virginia Court of Appeals,
the three criminal defendants in Briscoe v. Commonwealth,66 Cypress v. Common-
wealth,67 and Magruder v. Commonwealth68 alleged that the admission into evidence
61 Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (8th ed. 2004)).
62 Id.
63 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (1979) (“The accused in any hearing or trial in which
a certificate of analysis is admitted into evidence pursuant to § 19.2-187 or § 19.2-187.01
shall have the right to call the person performing such analysis or examination or involved in
the chain of custody as a witness therein, and examine him in the same manner as if he had
been called as an adverse witness. Such witness shall be summoned and appear at the cost of
the Commonwealth.”).
64 See id.
65 See id § 19.2-187.
66 No. 1478-06-4, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 498 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2007) (affirming the
Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria’s finding the defendant guilty for the possession of
cocaine with the intent to distribute and transporting cocaine into the Commonwealth with
the intent to distribute), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) . At trial, defendant’s counsel objected
to the Commonwealth introducing a certificate of analysis. Id. at *1. Not until the middle of
the trial did the defendant first express his desire to confront the witness who prepared the
certificate of analysis. Id. The trial judge overruled the defendant’s objection and admitted the
certificate of analysis into evidence. Id.
67 No. 1547-06-1, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 497 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2007) (affirming the
Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake’s finding the defendant guilty for possession of
cocaine with the intent to distribute), vacated sub nom. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316
(2010). At trial, defendant’s counsel objected to the Commonwealth introducing a certificate of
analysis. Id. at *1. The defendant first expressed his desire to confront the witness who prepared
the certificate of analysis in the middle of the trial. Id. The trial judge overruled the defendant’s
objection and admitted the certificate of analysis into evidence. Id. 
68 No. 1982-05-4, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 95 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2007), (affirming the
Circuit Court of the City of Winchester’s finding the defendant guilty for possession of cocaine).
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of a certificate of analysis, pursuant to section 19.2-187.1, “in the absence of testi-
mony at trial from the person who performed the particular analysis and prepared the
certificate violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment.”69  The three criminal defendants were each charged and convicted with pos-
session of cocaine in each respective Circuit Court.70  The defendants in Cypress,
Briscoe, and Magruder appealed their convictions from the Virginia Court of Appeals
to the Supreme Court of Virginia.  These three cases were consolidated and heard
together before the Supreme Court of Virginia.71
In each case, the Virginia Court of Appeals and subsequently the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that the procedure set forth in section 19.2-187.1 for a criminal defen-
dant to “demand” the presence of an expert at trial sufficiently protected a criminal
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.72  On appeal, both courts deter-
mined that because each of the criminal defendants failed to utilize the statutory
procedure available to him, and “demand” the presence of the analyst prior to the
commencement of his trial, each defendant automatically waived his right to chal-
lenge the admissibility of the certificate of analysis and therefore, each defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right was not violated.73
Melendez-Diaz was decided after Magruder.74  Four days after the United States
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court granted
a writ of certiorari to hear the appeal of the Virginia case, now styled Briscoe v.
Virginia.75  While the defendant in Briscoe appealed to the United States Supreme
It was not until his case was on appeal that defendant objected to the trial court’s admittance of
the certificate of analysis. Id. at *1-2. 
69 Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113, 115 (Va. 2008) (discussing the arguments
made before the Virginia Court of Appeals).
70 See supra notes 67–68.
71 See Magruder, 657 S.E.2d 113.
72 See id. at 113; Cypress, 657 S.E.2d at 113; Briscoe, 657 S.E.2d at 113.
73 Id. at 115.
74 Melendez-Diaz was decided in 2009 and Magruder was decided in 2007. See Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Magruder v. Commonwealth, No. 1982-05-4,
2007 Va. App. LEXIS 95 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2007).
75 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009). Many speculated that the dissenters in Melendez-Diaz, a 5-4
decision, were setting up a quick reversal of the case. Justice Souter, one of the five Justices
comprising the majority in Melendez-Diaz, has since retired. There was speculation that newly
appointed Justice Sotomayor would side with the Justices who dissented in Melendez-Diaz. See
Stephen Willis Murphy & Darryl K. Brown, The Confrontation Clause and the High Stakes of
the Court’s Consideration of Briscoe v. Virginia, VA. L. REV. INBRIEF (Jan. 23, 2010), http://
www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2010/01/23/murphybrown.pdf. However, others speculated
the United States Supreme Court was quick to grant certiorari so the Court could begin to inter-
pret which notice-and-demand statutes pass constitutional muster and which do not under
Melendez-Diaz. See Supreme Court Watch: Impact From Briscoe v. Virginia Remand, FED.
EVIDENCE REV. (Jan. 28, 2010), http://federalevidence.com/blog/2010/january/briscoe-v-vir
ginia-remand-leaves-unanswered-confrontation-clause-questions.
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Court,76 the defendant in Magruder declined to appeal the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia’s decision.77
When the three cases consolidated as Magruder came before the Supreme Court
of Virginia, Brooks v. Commonwealth78 set forth the current status of the law of Vir-
ginia interpreting section 19.2-187.1.79  The relevant facts in Brooks for interpreting
whether section 19.2-187.1 was followed by the courts and constitutional in light of
Crawford, were similar to those in Briscoe and Cypress.  The defendant was charged
with possession of cocaine and heroin and it was not until the trial that the defendant
sought to exclude the certificate of analysis claiming a violation of his right to con-
front witnesses against him.80  In Brooks, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that
section 19.2-187.1 provides a “reasonable procedure to be followed in order for a de-
fendant to exercise his right to confront a particular limited class of scientific wit-
nesses at trial and that a defendant’s failure to follow this procedure amounts to a
waiver of the constitutional right to confront such witnesses.”81  The Virginia Court
of Appeals concluded that the Court’s holding in Crawford did not compel a result
to the contrary and to support this premise, the court discussed State v. Cunningham,82
which was decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court and interpreted the constitution-
ality of Louisiana’s notice-and-demand statute83 in light of Crawford.84  The court,
in Brooks, examined Louisiana’s statute to assess what constituted a reasonable amount
of time prior to trial for the defendant to request the presence of the analyst.85
Pursuant to section 15:501 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, if the prosecutor
provided the defendant with written notice and a copy of the certificate of analysis
at least ten days prior to trial, “the court was required, subject to certain exceptions,
76 After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Briscoe was placed on the Supreme Court
calendar for the 2009 October Term. Oral arguments were conducted on Monday, January 11,
2010. On January 25, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion. The Court vacated
the Supreme Court of Virginia’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with Melendez-Diaz. See Briscoe, 129 S. Ct. at 2858.
77 One possible reason why the defendant in Magruder did not appeal to the United States
Supreme Court is his failure to assert that the admission of a certificate of analysis is a vio-
lation of his Sixth Amendment right until after the trial court reached its decision. Magruder
v. Commonwealth, No. 1982-05-4, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 95 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2007),
vacated sub nom. Briscoe v. Virginia 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010). Since the Supreme Court of
Virginia also heard cases and ruled against the defendants, where the defendants first raised at
trial, the objection to the use of certificate analysis, the defendant in Magruder may have be-
lieved his claim was not likely to succeed before the United States Supreme Court.
78 638 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 2006).
79 Id. at 135.
80 Id. at 133.
81 Id. at 136.
82 903 So. 2d 1110 (La. 2005).
83 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:501 (1990).
84 Brooks, 638 S.E.2d at 136.
85 Id. at 136-37.
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to admit the certificate as prima facie proof of the facts shown thereon, as prima facie
proof of [the chain of] custody of the physical evidence.”86  As long as the defendant
requests a subpoena for the expert performing the analysis at least five days before
the trial, the certificate of analysis does not serve as prima facie proof.87
Under the Virginia statute, if the Commonwealth intends to use a certificate of
analysis, the prosecution is required to file a copy of the certificate with the clerk’s
office and to provide notice to and a copy of the certificate to the defendant at least
seven days prior to the trial.88  Unlike Louisiana’s notice-and-demand statute, Virginia’s
statute did not provide a definitive period before the trial in which the defendant
needed to demand the presence of the analyst.89  Although Virginia’s statute does
not expressly define how far in advance of the trial the defendant must demand the
analyst’s presence, the court in Brooks looked at both the language and the interpre-
tation of the notice-and-demand statutes of other states to determine what constitutes
a reasonable period prior to trial in which the defendant must request the presence
of the analyst.90  In light of Crawford, the court in Brooks concluded that Virginia’s
applicable statutes, sections 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1
are merely a request to the defendant to stipulate to the admissi-
bility of the contents of any properly filed certificates of analysis. 
Where a defendant waits until trial to assert his right to cross-
examine the analyst who prepared a particular certificate, he
accepts the request to stipulate and waives his right to confront
that witness.91
The court determined it was unreasonable for the defendant to wait until his trial
to request the presence of the analyst who prepared the certificate.92  Brooks was
86 Cunningham, 903 So. 2d at 1115 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:501 (1990).
88 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (1979).
89 Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:501 (1990), with VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (1979).
90 Brooks, 638 S.E.2d at 136-37.
91 Id. at 137; see John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-
Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 228–29 (1999)
(“The Court’s approach still requires the government to produce an available declarant . . . .
This approach roughly adheres to the ‘core’ historical purpose of the Confrontation Clause:
preventing the inquisitorial practice of trial by affidavit or by ex parte examination. . . . [T]his
approach avoids the considerable systemic burden of requiring the government to produce
every available hearsay declarant as a predicate to the use of any hearsay. And by placing on
the defendant the burden of initiating confrontation . . . it avoids the backwards set of tactical
incentives that have created battles over admissibility . . . . Undoubtedly, it is less convenient
for defendants than a rule that required them to do nothing but object to the admission of hear-
say. Properly applied, however, a rule providing that defendants must request a subpoena to
invoke the confrontation right should not work serious hardship on defendants.”).
92 Brooks, 638 S.E.2d at 136.
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controlling when the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Magruder, Cypress, and
Briscoe.93  The United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Melendez-
Diaz after the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Magruder, Cypress, and Briscoe.94 
As previously discussed, Briscoe has been reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court and remanded to the Supreme Court of Virginia to assess the constitutionality
of section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Virginia in light of Melendez-Diaz.95
B. Public Opinion: Response to Melendez-Diaz and Possible Solutions
Immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz, Virginia
state officials concluded that a Special Session of the Virginia General Assembly
was the most efficient and practical way of addressing the effects of the decision for
two primary reasons.  First, Briscoe and the constitutionality of Virginia’s 1979 notice-
and-demand statute were awaiting review by the United States Supreme Court and
there was widespread belief that the legislature should change the statute rather than
waiting for a potentially damaging decision by the Court.96  According to former State
Senator Kenneth Cuccinelli, now Virginia Attorney General, “[i]f we lose that case,
there’s going to be a lot of remands for new trials . . . . That’s going to be a sudden
workload hit.”97  On remand, should the Supreme Court of Virginia conclude that
Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute denied the defendant the opportunity to exercise
his Sixth Amendment right, any case decided under that statute in favor of the Com-
monwealth after Melendez-Diaz, but prior to the Supreme Court of Virginia’s reeval-
uation of Briscoe, would subsequently be remanded.98  Second, even if the Virginia
General Assembly decided not to draft a statutory “fix” and the United States Supreme
93 Brooks was decided before the Virginia Court of Appeals on December 19, 2006. Id. at
131. After Brooks was decided and prior to the Supreme Court of Virginia deciding Magruder,
Cypress, and Briscoe, there were no other cases interpreting section 19.2-197.1 of the Code
of Virginia in which the criminal defendant claimed his Sixth Amendment right to confron-
tation had been violated.
94 Melendez-Diaz was decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 25, 2009.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
95 Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010). Although the 1979 version of Virginia’s
notice-and-demand statute has been amended, at this time there has been no ruling by the United
States Supreme Court on its constitutionality.
96 See GOVERNOR’S WORKING GRP., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, MELENDEZ-DIAZ
V. MASSACHUSETTS: IT’S A BRAVE NEW WORLD 8–10 (2009) [hereinafter BRAVE NEW WORLD];
see also Chris Dumond, Update: AG Candidate Wants Special Session After Supreme Court
Ruling, NEWS & ADVANCE (July 10, 2009, 1:31 PM), http://www2.newsadvance.com/
news/2009/jul/10/supreme_court_ruling_on_evidence_concerns_some_loc-ar-217088/ (quoting
Senator Ken Cuccinelli).
97 Dumond, supra note 96.
98 This would have a profound effect on the Virginia judicial system and Virginia Com-
monwealth Attorneys. There would be a significant backlog in both the courts and the
prosecutors’ offices.
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Court in reviewing Briscoe, subsequently found Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute
to be constitutional, the Commonwealth’s Attorneys would be faced with the problem
of selecting which cases to prosecute because of the shortage of lab analysts to both
test the substances and to testify at trial.99  Under Melendez-Diaz, the Commonwealth
must bring the analyst to court unless the defendant decides otherwise.  “Prosecutors
here claim the ruling puts their cases in jeopardy.  Many have asked for continuances
to bide time to get a lab analyst onto the witness stand.  ‘The practical effects of this
are too many cases, not enough scientists.’”100  The result of the shortage of analysts
from the Virginia Department of Forensic Science will become more apparent and
more pronounced as time goes by.101  “‘You’re getting a ripple effect on the calendar
that hasn’t hit us yet,’ said state Sen[ator] Ken Cuccinelli (R-Fairfax).  ‘I want to
solve this problem before we have public safety problems because we’re [releasing]
legitimately guilty drunk drivers and drug offenders.’”102
The Executive Office of the Governor and Governor Kaine’s working group pre-
dicted that the immediate problem with the Melendez-Diaz decision is that every case
in which the Commonwealth seeks to introduce certificates of analysis, there will be
a significant increase in the amount of time analysts spend outside the laboratory to
testify as to their findings.103  In discussing possible solutions, the Governor’s working
group determined that while a favorable ruling by the United States Supreme Court
on the constitutionality of section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Virginia in Briscoe would
be helpful, it would not solve the problem of the excessive workload placed upon the
99 See In Depth: Evidence Ruling Potentially “Horrific”, RICH. REP. (July 10, 2009), http://
nbc29.wordpress.com/2009/07/10/in-depth-evidence-ruling-potentially-horrific/.
100 Id. (emphasis removed) (quoting Tom Garrett, Commonwealth’s Attorney for Louisa
County) (“Garrett said he’s already had one drug case dismissed because of the ruling and has
asked judges to delay many more. If Garrett delays too many cases for too long, he’ll violate
defendants’ rights to speedy trials. If that happens, a judge will toss out the case.”).
101 BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 96, at 3–4 (“[I]n its last Service Area Strategic Plan . . .
DFS listed 74 positions [and] with 10 vacancies, this left 64 chemists. . . . By contrast, the 2008
Crime in Virginia report by the Virginia State Police listed 33,217 drug arrests in Virginia in
2008. If each of these arrests led to an analysis, each chemist would perform an average of 519
analyses in a year’s time. . . . Now, add to this the Melendez-Diaz requirement [and] [w]e will
need to hire three to four times the number of chemists we have now.”). The Virginia Depart-
ment of Forensic Science has four regional laboratories, Northern, Eastern, Central, and Western,
located respectively in Manassas, Norfolk, Richmond, and Roanoke, which service the entire
state. Regional Labs, VA. DEP’T OF FORENSIC SCI., http://www.dfs.virginia.gov/labs/index.cfm
(last visited March 4, 2010).
102 In Depth: Evidence Ruling Potentially “Horrific”, supra note 99.
103 BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 96, at 3. Part III of this Note will include specific statis-
tical data on the number of analysts at the Department of Forensic Science and the frequency that
criminal defendants “demanded” the presence of these analysts at trial both in cases pertaining
to possession of controlled substances and driving under the influence. Statistical data will be
provided for an average number of “demands” per month per category of cases both before and
after the Melendez-Diaz decision.
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analysts at the Virginia Department of Forensic Science.104  Should the United States
Supreme Court hold that Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute is permissible, “defense
attorneys know that all they will need to do is to push a button on their computer and
print a written demand for the presence of the laboratory analyst in every single
case. . . .  [T]he criminal justice system will quickly grind to a halt.”105  The general
consensus is regardless of whether the Supreme Court holds that Briscoe passes con-
stitutional muster, the Commonwealth needs to consider alternative solutions so the
Virginia judicial system is manageable and workable.106
The Governor’s working group107 considered several “solutions” in the weeks
following Melendez-Diaz.108  Yet, the general consensus was that none of these
104 Id. at 8.
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 The Governor’s working group consisted of (but was not limited to) representatives from
the following offices and interest groups: the Office of the Governor, the Office of the Attorney
General, the Department of Forensic Science, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, the
Commonwealth’s Attorneys’ Services Council, the Virginia State Police, and the Department
of Motor Vehicles. See GOVERNOR’S WORKING GRP., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS: WORKING GROUP OVERVIEW 1 (2009).
108 The following “solutions” were considered prior to calling the 2009 Special Session to
amend Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute. First, the Commonwealth could institute the de
facto decriminalization of drugs. BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 96, at 9. The Commonwealth
could decriminalize possession of certain simple drugs or decriminalize the quantities of certain
drugs possessed. Id. As a result, there would be fewer possession cases before the courts and a
reduced need to call analysts from the laboratory and into the court room. Second, the Common-
wealth could engage in more plea negotiations. Id. Pursuant to Melendez-Diaz, cross-examination
of the laboratory analysts is a constitutional right. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.
Ct. 2527, 2531–32 (2009). In light of Melendez-Diaz, if the Commonwealth fails to produce the
requested analyst at trial, the certificate of analysis will be inadmissible. Consequently, the Com-
monwealth is in a weaker bargaining position when participating in plea negotiations and plea
bargaining in drug and DUI cases will be unequivocally favorable to the defendant. BRAVE NEW
WORLD, supra note 96, at 9. Third, the Commonwealth could subpoena the analyst in all drug
and toxicology cases. Id. As a result, the criminal justice system would quickly become over-
burdened and because of Virginia’s speedy trial statute, many cases would likely be dismissed
with prejudice. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (2007) (“Where a district court has
found that there is probable cause to believe that an adult has committed a felony, the accused,
if he is held continuously in custody thereafter, shall be forever discharged from prosecution
for such offense if no trial is commenced in the circuit court within five months from the date
such probable cause was found by the district court . . . .”); Cuccinelli Calls for Special Session,
supra note 21; In Depth: Evidence Ruling Potentially “Horrific,” supra note 99. Fourth, the
Commonwealth could hire additional laboratory analysts, thereby reducing the number of tests
each analyst had to conduct and increasing their availably to testify to their results. See BRAVE
NEW WORLD, supra note 96, at 9. Hiring additional analysts is not a viable solution in light
of the recent economic climate. In order to maintain a balanced budget, the Commonwealth
approved budget cuts over the past two years; the creation of a substantial number of new posi-
tions to compensate for the decision in Melendez-Diaz is not economically feasible. Id. at 4;
see Jim Nolan & Tyler Whitley, Kaine Seeks New Round of Virginia Budget Cuts, RICH. TIMES-
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proposed “solutions” were feasible.109  As explained above, while each “solution” may
temporarily alleviate the impact that Melendez-Diaz has had on Virginia’s judicial
system, none is a long-term viable option.  It is important to note that the defendant
does not typically want to cross-examine the analyst because it is highly likely that
his testimony will confirm the findings in the certificate of analysis.110  The goal of
defense counsel “in the present Melendez-Diaz environment is to engage in a war
of attrition where the only attrition is on the Commonwealth.  Once we alleviate the
need for laboratory personnel to travel throughout the state, the defense bar will move
on to other, more conventional defenses.”111  As a result, legislation appeared to be
the best alternative to ensure that the entire judicial system did not collapse.  Accord-
ing to Sharon Eimer, a member of the Lynchburg Public Defender’s Office, “once the
law is fixed the question of delays and testimony will largely go away.  ‘In reality,
[the defense attorney is] going to talk to the analyst ahead of time and if there’s not
an issue, you’re not going to want to call the analyst (as a witness).’”112  Therefore,
many politicians, state agencies, and interest groups garnered support for a Special
Session of the Virginia General Assembly.113  The goal of the Special Session was
to amend Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute to reduce the burden on Virginia’s
judicial system as a result of Melendez-Diaz, and at the same time comply with consti-
tutional mandates established by Melendez-Diaz.114
DISPATCH, (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2009/aug/20/budg20
_20090819-215608-ar-33524/; Gail D. Jaspen, Chief Deputy Director, Department of Forensic
Science, Address at the University of Richmond Law Review Annual Survey Symposium:
Melendez-Diaz in Virginia (Nov. 12, 2009), http://lawreview.richmond.edu/the-annual-survey
-of-virginia-law-symposium-melendez-diaz-in-virginia/ [hereinafter Jaspen, University of
Richmond Address] (presentation materials on file with author). Fifth, the Commonwealth could
ask courts to be flexible in scheduling trial dates by placing numerous cases that a particular
analyst tested and prepared the results on the docket on the same date. BRAVE NEW WORLD,
supra note 96, at 9. This assumes the collaboration by numerous judicial jurisdictions, defense
attorneys, and prosecutors and currently, there is no central operating system to assist in sched-
uling. Id. at 9–10. In addition, there is no incentive for defense attorneys to be flexible because
if the Commonwealth fails to produce a requested analyst, the evidence will be inadmissible.
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531–32; BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 96, at 10.
109 BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 96, at 10.
110 Id. The cross-examination of an analyst who testifies to the results of the certificate of
analysis is different than the cross-examination of a witness at a crime scene who provided
a sworn affidavit to the police officer. The results of the tests performed by the analyst are
highly accurate and the analyst’s testimony will likely confirm what was reported in the
certificate. The statements provided by a witness to an officer at a crime (either a charge of
possession or driving under the influence) may more easily be undermined by placing that
individual on the stand at trial.
111 Id.
112 Dumond, supra note 96.
113 See, e.g., Cuccinelli Calls for Special Session, supra note 21; In Depth: Evidence Ruling
Potentially “Horrific”, supra note 99; Dumond, supra note 96.
114 Cuccinelli Calls for Special Session, supra note 21.
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C. Notice-and-Demand Statutes
1. Explanation of Notice-and-Demand Statutes
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court cited the notice-and-demand statutes of Georgia,
Texas, and Ohio to support the position that,
[i]n their simplest form, notice-and-demand statutes require the
prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use
an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant
is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission
of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at trial.115
When referencing these statutes, the Court implied that these statutes would with-
stand any constitutional challenge pursuant to the ruling in Melendez-Diaz.  The ma-
jority of the Court in Melendez-Diaz agrees that “[t]he defendant always has the burden
of raising his Confrontation Clause objection; notice-and-demand statutes simply gov-
ern the time within which he must do so.”116
Under a traditional notice-and-demand statute, the timing in which the prosecu-
tion must provide “notice” of its intent to use a certificate of analysis in lieu of the
live testimony of the analyst and the defendant must “demand” the presence of the
analyst in lieu of admittance of the certificate of analysis can vary in two primary
regards.117  First, some statutes do not include a set number of days prior to the date
of trial in which the prosecution must provide “notice,” while other statutes link the
time in which the prosecution must provide “notice” to the date of trial.118  Second,
under some statutes, the time in which the defendant must “demand” the presence
of the analyst is linked to the time in which the prosecution provided “notice,” while
other statutes tie the “demand” requirement to the date of trial.119  The notice-and-
demand statutes cited in Melendez-Diaz are examples of these variations.  The Court
implied that each of the statutes discussed below, which govern the prosecution’s
obligation to provide “notice” and the defendant’s responsibility to “demand,” would
protect the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.120
115 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009) (citing GA. CODE ANN.
§ 35-3-154.1 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.41, § 4 (West 2005)).
116 Id.
117 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West
2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (West 2005).
118 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1 (2006), and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51
(West 2006), with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (West 2005).
119 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006), with GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-
154.1 (2006), and TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (West 2005).
120 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009).
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2. Georgia’s Notice-and-Demand Statute
Georgia’s notice-and-demand statute provides that the “prosecuting attorney shall
serve a copy on the defendant’s attorney of record, or on the defendant if pro se, prior
to the first proceeding in which the report is to be used against the defendant.”121  Any
report provided by the prosecution to the defense under this section “shall contain
notice of the right to demand the testimony of the person signing the report.”122  Upon
receiving the report, the defendant may object to the introduction of the report at
trial so long as that objection is made at least ten days prior to the trial.123  “If objection
is made, the judge shall require the employee to be present to testify.  The state shall
diligently investigate the witness’s availability and report to the court.  If the witness
is not available on a timely basis, the court shall grant a continuance.”124
In Georgia, the time in which the prosecution must provide notice is not ex-
pressly stated in the statute.  For notice to be proper, it must be provided more than
ten days prior to trial because demand must be made at least ten days prior to trial.125 
Virginia amended its notice-and-demand statute and tied the provision governing
notice to the date of trial, while tying the provision governing demand to the date
of notice.126
3. Texas’s Notice-and-Demand Statute
Texas’s notice-and-demand statute provides that the prosecuting attorney must
file the certificate of analysis “with the clerk of the court and a copy must be pro-
vided . . . to the opposing party.”127  The time in which the prosecution must provide
notice is tied to the date of trial.  The prosecution must provide notice “[n]ot later
than the 20th day before the trial begins.”128  Demand by the defendant is deemed
proper and physical presence of the analyst in lieu of the certificate of analysis will be
required if, “not later than the 10th day before the trial begins, the [defendant] files a
written objection to the use of the certificate with the clerk of the court and provides
a copy . . . to the offering party.”129
In Texas, both the time in which the prosecution must give notice of its intent to use
a certificate of analysis and the provision governing when the defendant must de-
mand the presence of the analyst are tied to the date of trial.130  In Virginia and Texas,





126 See infra Part II.D.




2010] THE MELENDEZ-DIAZ DILEMMA 437
provisions governing notice are similar because the notice-and-demand statutes in both
states tie the time in which the prosecution must provide notice to the date of trial.131
4. Ohio’s Notice-and-Demand Statute
Ohio’s notice-and-demand statute provides that “[t]he prosecuting attorney shall
serve a copy of the report on the attorney of record for the accused, or on the accused
if the accused has no attorney, prior to any proceeding in which the report is to be used
against the accused . . . .”132  After receiving notice, the defendant may object to the
admittance of the certificate of analysis so long as demand is made within seven days
of receiving notice.133
In Ohio, the time in which the prosecution must provide notice is not expressly
stated in the statute.  For notice to be proper, it must be made more than seven days
prior to trial because the defendant has seven days from the date of notice to demand
the presence of the analyst.134  Ohio’s notice-and-demand statute is similar to Vir-
ginia’s in that the provision governing the time in which the defendant must demand
the presence of the analyst is tied to the date the prosecution provided notice of its
intent to use a certificate of analysis.135
D. Virginia’s Amended Notice-and-Demand Statute, a Response to Melendez-Diaz
On August 19, 2009, members of the Virginia General Assembly convened in
Richmond, Virginia, for a Special Session to address the impact of Melendez-Diaz
on the Commonwealth.136  Prior to convening, there were meetings amongst the lead-
ership of the Virginia Senate and House of Delegates, as well as numerous meetings
with representatives from the different stakeholders, such as the Governor’s Office, the
Attorney General’s Office, the Virginia State Police, the Virginia Department of Motor
Vehicles, the Commonwealth’s Attorneys’ Services Council, and the Association of
Defense Attorneys.137  A significant amount of planning preceded the 2009 Special
Session, because the legislators agreed that the Special Session would only last for one
day.138  This was largely attributed to the fact that every day the General Assembly
131 Compare id., with VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009).
132 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Compare id., with VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009).
136 See William C. Flook, Lawmakers Seek Fix for Tougher Forensic Rules, WASH. EXAM-
INER (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/Lawmakers-seek-fix-for
-tougher-forensics-rules-8124467-53617487.html.
137 See Tyler Whitley, Court-ruling Solutions are Elusive, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 8,
2009, at B3; Alan Cooper, Committees Meet on Melendez-Diaz, VA. LAW. WKLY. BLOG (Aug.
7, 2009), http://valawyersweekly.com/vlwblog/2009/08/07/committees-meet-on-melendez-diaz/.
138 Interview with Mark Rubin, Chief of Staff, Executive Office of the Governor of Virginia,
in Richmond, Va. (Nov. 12, 2009) (on file with author).
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convenes during a Special Session, it costs the Commonwealth between $30,000 and
$50,000.139  As a demonstration of the importance of crafting a legislative solution,
the statute was amended in a one day session and Governor Kaine signed House Bill
5007 on August 21, 2009,140 only two days later.141  The legislators, in drafting what
they believed would be an appropriate legislative response, not only considered the
views of the stakeholders, but also seem to have studied the statutes the majority in
Melendez-Diaz implied would be constitutional.142
The Court, in Melendez-Diaz, cites the Georgia, Texas, and Ohio statutes to support
the position that notice-and-demand statutes, in their simplest form, are constitutional. 
The Virginia General Assembly amended section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Virginia,
and the amended version possesses some of the elements that appear in the notice-
and-demand statutes of Georgia, Texas, and Ohio.143  If the Commonwealth intends
to offer a certificate of analysis at any trial or any hearing, other than the preliminary
hearing, the Commonwealth shall “[p]rovide by mail, delivery, or otherwise, a copy
of the certificate to counsel of record for the accused, or to the accused if he is pro-
ceeding pro se, at no charge, no later than 28 days prior to the hearing or trial.”144 
In addition to providing the defendant with a copy of the certificate of analysis, the
Commonwealth must provide “notice to the accused of his right to object to having
the certificate admitted without the person who performed the analysis or examination
being present and testifying.”145  Also, on the same day the Commonwealth provides
the certificate and notice to the defendant, both a copy of the certificate of analysis
and notice must be filed in the office of the clerk of court.146
The accused may object in writing to admission of the certificate
of analysis, in lieu of testimony . . . .  Such objection shall be
filed . . . no more than 14 days after the certificate and notice
were filed with the clerk by the attorney for the Commonwealth
or the objection shall be deemed waived.147
There are several noticeable differences between the 1979 and 2009 versions of
section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Virginia.148  First, the amended version expressly
139 Id.
140 2009 Va. Acts (Spec. Sess. I) 1. House Bill 5007 was the bill passed during the Special
Session that now reflects the changes to section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Virginia.
141 Id.
142 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009).
143 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1
(2006), and TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 § 4 (West 2005), and OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006), with VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009).




148 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (1979), with VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009).
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provides that the defendant has to object within fourteen days of receiving notice
from the Commonwealth;149 whereas, the 1979 version did not designate a time in
which this objection had to be made.150  This will assist the Commonwealth in coordi-
nating with the Department of Forensic Science to ensure that the analyst who prepared
the certificate will be present at trial.  This framework will increase the chances that
the Commonwealth can proceed and prosecute a particular case in a timely manner
while the previous version would allow the defendant to object on the day of trial, and
in light of Melendez-Diaz, that objection may be valid.151
Second, the Code explicitly states that if the defendant fails to object to the certi-
ficate being admitted into evidence within the permissible timeline provided for in
the statute, then the demand is deemed waived;152 whereas the 1979 version did not
expressly state the right was waived if not exercised.153  If demand is waived, the
defendant has forfeited his right to confront witnesses against him.154  This will elim-
inate future claims by a defendant who fails to object to the certificate until the day
of trial and later asserts that the timing of his objection did not result in waiver of his
confrontation rights.
As a result of Melendez-Diaz, regardless of whether the Virginia General Assembly
amended the Code, it is now a defendant’s constitutional right and not just a statutory
right to have the expert present at both the hearings and at trial for cross-examination.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF MELENDEZ-DIAZ ON THE VIRGINIA JUDICIAL SYSTEM:
EFFECTS ON CASES WHERE THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH
POSSESSION OF NARCOTICS OR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
A. Background on the Virginia Department of Forensic Science
According to Tom Garrett, the Louisa County Commonwealth’s Attorney, the
Virginia Department of Forensic Science (DFS) “simply doesn’t have the manpower
to have its examiners running all over the state to testify.”155  During the 2008 calendar
year, with a staff of 160 employees, DFS handled nearly 60,000 cases and “[t]he num-
ber of tests [conducted was] even higher because many cases involve[d] multiple
pieces of evidence.”156  In August 2008, DFS had 74 available positions within its
149 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009).
150 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (1979).
151 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531–32 (2009) (“Absent a showing
that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that [the defendant] had a prior oppor-
tunity to cross-examine them, [the defendant is] entitled to ‘be confronted with’ the analysts at
trial.” (citations omitted)).
152 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009).
153 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (1979).
154 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531–32, 2534.
155 Dumond, supra note 96.
156 Id.
440 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:419
Chemical Analysis Services division and at the time there were ten vacancies.157  Prior
to the decision in Melendez-Diaz, the number of cases in which an analyst was subpoe-
naed was relatively low.  For example, in April and May of 2009, the total subpoenas
for each month was 487 and 503, respectively,158 and the number of hours the analysts
spent out of the laboratory was 350 and 320, respectively.159  With each analyst travel-
ing around the state to testify in the cases in which he performed the laboratory tests,
DFS anticipates that each analyst will spend approximately three to four days per week
on the road testifying to his findings.160  Hence, DFS anticipates this increasing demand
on its analysts for court appearances will necessitate hiring three to four times the num-
ber of analysts currently employed by DFS in order to prevent a backlog requiring
the Commonwealth to dismiss or nolle prosse a substantial number of its cases.161 
The Commonwealth has budgeted $8,261,000 in FY 2010 for analysts; however,
due to the increased demand for laboratory analysts as a result of Melendez-Diaz,162
Virginia is “facing an immediate budgetary increase of between $24,783,000 and
$33,044,000.”163  Furthermore, the Commonwealth will need to purchase approxi-
mately sixty to seventy state vehicles or reimburse each analyst for his mileage.164
B. Statistics: Possession of Narcotics
In 2008, the Virginia State Police reported 33,217 drug arrests throughout the
Commonwealth.165  If each of these arrests led to an analysis, on average, each analyst
would be required to perform 519 analyses a year.166  As a result of Melendez-Diaz,
these analysts must be available to be present at each of these 519 cases to allow the
defendant to cross-examine them on their findings unless the defendant waives his
rights.  Since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Melendez-Diaz in June,
157 BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 96, at 4.
158 Jaspen, University of Richmond Address, supra note 108.
159 Id.
160 BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 96, at 4.
161 Id. The Commonwealth must remember that because Melendez-Diaz was handed down
by the United States Supreme Court, all fifty states will be looking to hire additional analysts
to keep the prosecutors in each respective state from having to dismiss or nolle prosse many
pending cases.
162 Id.
163 Id. This is a substantial increase in the state’s budget, especially since it is dedicated to
one particular service. As a result of the current economic situation, it is highly unlikely that the
General Assembly could come up with this money during the 2010 General Assembly Session.
164 Id. The current state rate is 50.5 cents per mile. See Virginia Workers’ Compensation
Commission Chronological Compensation Benefits Chart, VA. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, http://www.vwc.state.va.us/portal/vwc-website/helpfulresources/customerassist
ance/customerassistancebeneamt (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). This rate fluctuates, and if gasoline
prices increase, this rate will increase and place additional costs on the Commonwealth.
165 BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 96, at 4.
166 Id.
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DFS has seen a substantial increase in subpoenas for the appearance of drug analysts
in court.167
In July 2008, there were 43 subpoenas for drug section analysts168 versus 1,242
in July 2009, a month after the Supreme Court’s decision.169  The analysts spent 324
hours away from the laboratory and in the courtroom during July 2009;170 whereas
they spent only 230 outside the laboratory and in the courtroom during the entire eleven
preceding months.171  Commonwealth’s Attorney Garrett said his “relatively small
jurisdiction has ‘dozens and dozens’ of cases that could be affected by the ruling [in
Melendez-Diaz]. . . . [and] one cocaine case in Louisa already has been dismissed
because the forensic analyst was not present.”172  During the days and weeks leading
up to the Special Session, the general sentiment was that “[h]opes are dim . . . that
a single day of legislating can fully undo the headaches caused by June’s Melendez-
Diaz decision . . . .  The vastly increased demand for the experts already has caused
some cases to be thrown out.”173
Since section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Virginia was amended in August of 2009,
there have been fewer controlled substance subpoenas and analysts have spent fewer
hours outside of the laboratory compared to the time between the Court’s decision on
June 25, 2009, and when the Code of Virginia was amended on August 19, 2009.174 
Analysts spent more hours in the court room during the month following Melendez-
Diaz than in the previous eleven months combined.175  In September and October of
2009, the total number of controlled substance subpoenas was 1,034 and 822, respec-
tively, and the hours out of the laboratory were 539 and 361, respectively.176  While
it is too early to gauge to what extent amending Virginia’s Code will reduce the number
of subpoenas received by DFS, the initial trend is that both fewer controlled sub-
stance subpoenas are being issued and analysts are spending fewer hours outside
the laboratory.177
167 See BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 96; Editorial, Taking a Bite Out of Crime Fighting:
Virginia Labs are Hobbled by the Supreme Court, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009, at A22; Flook,
supra note 136.
168 Flook, supra note 136.
169 Jaspen, University of Richmond Address, supra note 108, at 94.
170 Id.
171 Flook, supra note 136.
172 Dumond, supra note 96. The dismissal occurred within two weeks of the decision and
was one of many instances where the Commonwealth could not present its case.
173 Flook, supra note 136 (italics added).
174 See Jaspen, University of Richmond Address, supra note 108, at 94.
175 See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. It is likely that the total number of hours
spent outside a laboratory for a particular month is not representative of the total number of sub-
poenas received for that month. For example, the number of hours spent outside of the laboratory
in July 2009 may reflect the total number of subpoenas received for the prior month.
176 Gail Jaspen, Impact on Department of Forensic Science of Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts: Monthly Data from April 2009 Through July 2010 (2010) (presentation
materials on file with author) [hereinafter Jaspen, Presentation].
177 Id.
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C. Statistics: Driving Under the Influence
The effects of Melendez-Diaz have also been profound on toxicology cases.  In
Virginia, there were 28,227 DUI arrests in 2008.178  These arrests resulted in either a
blood or breath test, unless the arrestee refused to provide a blood alcohol sample.179 
All blood tests are sent to DFS for analysis; whereas, the breath tests are analyzed by
local law enforcement officers.180  According to Pete Marone, the director of DFS,
“Virginia has just three people who calibrate and certify the more than 200 breath-
alyzer machines in the state.”181
Since Melendez-Diaz, “defense lawyers began objecting to breath-test certificates
in drunken driving cases in which the technician or the person who calibrated the ma-
chine wasn’t in court.”182  The law in Virginia “requires proof of breathalyzer calibra-
tion, meaning confirmation that the machines work . . . . Five cases in Fairfax County
have been thrown out on such challenges.”183  These five cases were dismissed less than
a month after the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz.184  The cases dismissed
in Fairfax are an example from just one jurisdiction where the analysts have been
unable to appear in court to testify to the findings of the blood-alcohol certificates.185 
This demonstrates the effects that Melendez-Diaz has had on the system in less than
a month after the decision was handed down.  If the Virginia General Assembly failed
to adopt a statutory solution, the adverse consequences to the Virginia judicial system
would be profound.
Although there has been a downward trend for subpoenas of analysts who prepared
certificates concerning controlled substances, there has been an increase for subpoenas
of analysts who prepared breath alcohol certificates.186  Consequently, analysts have
spent fewer hours in court testifying about controlled substance charges and more hours
testifying about alcohol charges.187  In July 2009, DFS received thirty-three breath
alcohol subpoenas and analysts spent forty-three hours out of the laboratory.188  In
September and October of 2009, the total number of breath alcohol subpoenas was
64 and 114, respectively, and the hours out of the laboratory in September were 251.189
178 BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 96, at 4.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Tom Jackman & Rosalind S. Helderman, Kaine Calls Session to Amend Laws on Trial




185 See id.; Dumond, supra note 96.
186 Jaspen, University of Richmond Address, supra note 108, at 93–94.
187 See id.
188 Id. at 93.
189 Id.; Jaspen, Presentation, supra note 176.
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IV. WILL VIRGINIA’S NOTICE-AND-DEMAND STATUTE SUSTAIN A
CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK UNDER MELENDEZ-DIAZ?
A. Informational Background for Hypothetical Scenarios Assessing the
Constitutionality of Virginia’s Amended Notice-and-Demand Statute
As mentioned in Part II, Justice Scalia cited the notice-and-demand statutes of
several states for the proposition that these statutes were constitutional in light of
Melendez-Diaz.190  In his opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that “[c]ontrary to the dissent’s
perception, these statutes shift no burden whatever.  The defendant always has the
burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection; notice-and-demand statutes
simply govern the time within which he must do so.  States are free to adopt proce-
dural rules governing objections.”191  Defendants who wish to exercise their Sixth
Amendment compulsory process rights192 are commonly required to announce their
intent to call witnesses in advance of trial pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.193  In his opinion, Scalia wrote that “[t]here is no conceivable reason why
[the criminal defendant] cannot similarly be compelled to exercise his Confrontation
Clause rights before trial. . . . Today’s decision will not disrupt criminal prosecu-
tions in the many large States whose practice is already in accord with the Confron-
tation Clause.”194
This Part will provide several hypothetical scenarios in which the Commonwealth
provided proper “notice” pursuant to section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Virginia, but
the defendant failed to “demand” the presence of the analyst within the permissive
time period set forth in the statute.  Although the defendant failed to make a timely
demand in these hypothetical scenarios, the author will posit that, should Virginia’s
notice-and-demand statute be challenged before the United States Supreme Court, it
should withstand a constitutional attack under the criteria set forth in Melendez-Diaz.
In the hypothetical scenarios below, the defendant is charged with possession of
cocaine.  The white powdered substance is confiscated during an authorized search
190 Melendez-Diaz v. Masschusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009). See generally GA. CODE
ANN. § 35-3-154.1 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (West 2005).
191 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.
192 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”).
193 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(a) & (e), 16(b)(1)(C).
194 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541. There is a long-standing tradition that a defendant must
exercise his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause prior to trial. The
Court concluded that it is not unreasonable to require a defendant to exercise his rights under the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. It is noteworthy that the Court did not explicitly de-
fine “reasonable,” but rather cited several notice-and-demand statutes that the Court believed
were constitutional under Melendez-Diaz.
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of the defendant’s car.  The substance is submitted to DFS and tested by one of the
analysts.  The results confirm that the substance suspected by the officers to be cocaine
is in fact cocaine.
B. Application One: Notice Provided Twenty-Nine Days Prior to Trial and
Demand Occurred More than Fourteen Days Later
Under this hypothetical scenario, assume that on May 1st the Commonwealth
provided a copy of the certificate to defendant’s counsel and notice to the defendant
of his constitutional right to object to the admittance of the certificate into evidence
without the presence of the analyst at trial.  After providing a copy of the certificate
and the notice to defendant, the Commonwealth, on the same day, filed copies in clerk
of court’s office.  In addition, the trial is scheduled for May 30th.  Under Virginia’s
recently amended notice-and-demand statute, notice by the Commonwealth is deemed
proper.195  Assume that the defense attorney demanded the presence of the analyst
sometime between May 16th and May 30th, the date of trial.  Pursuant to Virginia’s
notice-and-demand statute, the defendant has failed to demand the analyst’s presence
within the time period required by the statute.196
Because of the defendant’s untimely request pursuant to section 19.2-187.1, the
Commonwealth relies on the certificate of analysis at trial.  At trial, on May 30th,
the prosecution offers into evidence the certificate of analysis prepared by the analyst
at DFS as proof that the white powdered substance in the defendant’s car was cocaine. 
The defendant objects, claiming the use of the certificate violates his Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront witnesses against him.  Even in light of Melendez-Diaz, the trial
judge concludes that the defendant did not demand the presence of the analyst in a
“reasonable” amount of time prior to trial.197  Ultimately, the case is appealed to the
United States Supreme Court where the defendant asserts section 19.2-187.1 is uncon-
stitutional in light of Melendez-Diaz.
195 See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
196 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
197 In this application, the defendant did not comply with the statutory requirement prescribed
in section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Virginia. The failure of the criminal defendant to comply
with the requirements set forth in a notice-and-demand statute will always trigger a statutory
violation, but pursuant to Melendez-Diaz will not always result in a waiver of his constitutional
right to confront witnesses against him. For example, if a criminal defendant fails to comply
with the statute and the court subsequently finds the statute unconstitutional in light of Melendez-
Diaz, the criminal defendant will have failed to comply with the statutory provision without
having waived his constitutional right. In the aforementioned application, the trial judge would
use his discretion when allowing the prosecution to enter into evidence the certificate of analysis
in lieu of the analyst being physically present for trial. By admitting the certificate of analysis
over the defendant’s objection, the judge would hold that section 19.2-187.1 is constitutional
pursuant to Melendez-Diaz. Therefore, due to the defendant’s failure to “demand” the presence
of the analyst in the statutorily proscribed time, the defendant waived his constitutional right
to confront witnesses against him.
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This Note posits that under this hypothetical scenario, section 19.2-187.1 of the
Code of Virginia would survive the constitutional challenge under Melendez-Diaz. 
Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion, discussed Georgia’s, Texas’s, and Ohio’s notice-
and-demand statutes and implied that they would likely be declared constitutional.198 
Under Virginia’s statute, the timeline in which the prosecution must provide notice is
more stringent for the prosecution than under the Texas statute.199  In addition, Vir-
ginia’s statute is more lenient than that of Texas in that the defendant has a longer
period of time to “demand” the presence of the analyst from the period in which
“notice” was provided.200
C. Application Two: Notice Provided Forty-Five Days Prior to Trial and
Demand Occurred Fifteen Days Later, Thirty Days Prior to Trial
Under this hypothetical scenario, assume on April 15, the Commonwealth provides
the defendant with both a copy of the certificate of analysis and notice of his right to
confront the analyst that prepared the certificate.  Also, the Commonwealth filed with
198 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009) (citing GA. CODE ANN.
§ 35-3-154.1 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.51 (West 2006); TEX. CODE. CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (West 2005)); see also supra Part II.C.1.
199 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009), with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.41 (West 2005). In Virginia, the prosecution must provide “notice” at least twenty-eight days
prior to the date of trial; whereas in Texas, the prosecution is required to provide “notice” at least
twenty days prior to the date of trial. A prosecutor in Virginia who intends to use a certificate of
analysis must provide “notice” over a week in advance of a similarly situated prosecutor in
Texas. Virginia’s provision, requiring earlier notice, is more defendant-friendly because it pro-
vides the defense with notice a greater number of days prior to the date of trial. The Court in
Melendez-Diaz said notice-and-demand statutes are proper because they are not burden-shifting.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541. Additionally, the Court cited the Texas statute for the propo-
sition that it would be deemed constitutional in light of its decision. See id. Since Virginia’s
“notice” provision is more defendant-friendly than Texas’s “notice” provision, the author of
this Note posits that Virginia’s requirement of notice at least twenty-eight days prior to trial
would be deemed constitutional in light of Melendez-Diaz.
200 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009), with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.41 (West 2005). In Virginia, the defendant’s “demand” is deemed proper if made within
fourteen days of receiving notice, whereas in Texas, the defendant is required to “demand”
the presence of the analyst within ten days of receiving notice. A defendant in Virginia who
objects to the use of a certificate of analysis has four more days to make that objection known
than a similarly situated defendant in Texas. Virginia’s provision is more defendant-friendly
because it grants the defendant a greater time period to “demand” the presence of the analyst.
By allowing four additional days than provided in the Texas statute, Virginia’s statute further
reduces the burden of the “demand” requirement imposed on the defendant. Since Virginia’s
“demand” provision is more defendant-friendly than Texas’s provision, the author of this Note
posits that requiring defendant to “demand” within fourteen days in order to exercise his confron-
tation right would be deemed constitutional in light of Melendez-Diaz.
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the clerk’s office the materials submitted to the defendant.  The trial is scheduled for
May 30th.  Because the Commonwealth provided notice more than twenty-eight days
before trial, notice was deemed proper under section 19.2-187.1 of the Code of Vir-
ginia.  The defendant demanded the presence of the analyst more than fourteen days
later.  At trial, on May 30th, the prosecution offers into evidence the certificate as
proof that the white powdered substance in the defendant’s car was cocaine.  The
defendant objects claiming the use of the certificate violates his Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses against him.  The trial court permitted the introduction
of the certificate and subsequently found the defendant guilty of possession of cocaine. 
Ultimately, the case is appealed to the United States Supreme Court where the defen-
dant claims section 19.2-187.1 is unconstitutional in light of Melendez-Diaz.
Under Melendez-Diaz, the author of this Note posits that should the constitution-
ality of section 19.2-187.1 be challenged in the aforementioned hypothetical sce-
nario, the statute would pass constitutional muster.  Under Virginia’s statute, the
timeline in which the prosecution must provide notice is defined; whereas in Ohio,
the prosecution has no restrictions on the time in which notice must be provided.201 
In addition, Virginia’s statute provides greater safeguards and is more lenient than
Ohio’s in that the defendant has a longer period of time to “demand” the presence
of the analyst from the date on which “notice” was provided.202
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court significantly expanded the scope of a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him in Melendez-Diaz, the major-
ity downplayed this expansion and tried to indicate it had not departed from its holding
in Crawford.  Rather, the Court considerably changed the protections offered under this
constitutional guarantee by affirming what defendants have claimed to be a constitu-
tional right since its inception: the right to cross-examine testimonial statements, which
includes the right to cross-examine the author of the certificate of analysis.
201 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 
(West 2006). In Virginia, the prosecution must provide “notice” at least twenty-eight days prior
to the date of trial; whereas, in Ohio, the prosecution may provide “notice” at any time. Under
this application, the prosecution provided “notice” to the defendant forty-five days prior to the
date of trial. Notice would be deemed proper under both the Virginia and Ohio Statute.
202 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51
(West 2006). In Virginia, the defendant has fourteen days to “demand” the presence of the
analyst from the date of receiving “notice.” VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009). In Ohio, the
defendant must exercise his right to “demand” the presence of the analyst within seven days of
receiving “notice.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006). Under this application, the
prosecution provided “notice” to the defendant forty-five days prior to the date of trial. In
Virginia, demand would be proper up until thirty-one days prior to the date of trial; whereas, in
Ohio, demand would only be proper if made at least thirty-eight days prior to the date of trial.
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This Note first suggested that, as a result of the Court’s decision in Melendez-
Diaz, prosecutors around the country have been left in a vulnerable position because
of the momentous influx of requests by defendants for the presence of the analyst
at trial.  Additionally, requiring the analysts’ presence at trial will have a grave impact
on the ability of each respective state’s department of forensic science to remain
current in testing for alcohol quantity and illegal narcotics.  In effect, without some
statutory provision to assist in administering the defendants’ requests, Melendez-
Diaz will paralyze prosecutors around the country and greatly inhibit their ability
to prosecute their cases.  To demonstrate the undue burden placed on the government,
this Note explored the impact of Melendez-Diaz on Virginia, including the limita-
tions placed on prosecutors, the Virginia Department of Forensic Science, and the
Virginia judicial system.
Next, this Note proposed that the unfettered rights granted to a defendant as a result
of Melendez-Diaz may be modified by statutory construction to provide administra-
tive ease, which may still be deemed constitutional under the decision.  Virginia’s
notice-and-demand statute adopted elements from those statutes cited by the majority
in Melendez-Diaz.  This Note posits that in light of the Court’s discussion of the scope
of a defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him, coupled with its discussion
of the notice-and-demand statutes of Georgia, Texas, and Ohio, if the constitutionality
of Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute is challenged, it will be deemed constitutional.
